

The opportunities ahead

Australian critical minerals in a fragmented world

In partnership with CMC Markets

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About this project

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
Executive Summary

From the gold rush of the 1850s to the wool boom of the 1950s, Australia's prosperity has long been shaped by commodities. Previous cycles, including the iron ore-led resources supercycle of the early 2000s, were market-led: a story of supply, demand and price dynamics. The current critical minerals cycle is different: a geopolitical story playing out in a market context.

Minerals such as copper, lithium and rare earth elements are considered critical because they underpin sectors such as renewable energy, defence and data centres. Australia, with its considerable endowment of critical minerals and its vast mining expertise, is well placed to benefit from energy, national security and AI-driven demand.

Yet critical minerals markets don't always function in a dynamic, free way. China dominates demand, supply and pricing, and is decades ahead of its rivals in building processing capacity and customer networks. Critical mineral markets are shaped by government intervention through export controls, stockpiles, industrial policy and geopolitical alliances. Western governments are increasingly collaborating to support the creation of an ex-China supply chain.

This presents an opportunity for Australia to capture more of the downstream benefit of its geological wealth. However, the opportunity also carries risk and cost. Australia must balance its interests against those of the US, its primary security ally, and China, its largest trading partner and biggest customer of critical minerals. Building a parallel supply chain favours strategic resilience, but this comes at the cost of economic efficiency. For investors, returns will depend on whether Australia can balance and convert its strategic partnerships and mineral endowment into secure, bankable and value-added projects.




Principal findings:

- **Critical minerals are a commodity market, but not as you know it.** Increased geopolitical and geoeconomic fragmentation means that critical minerals do not move as a single market. Some trade through relatively deep markets and respond to conventional commodity signals, while others are driven primarily by government interventions like subsidies, export controls, strategic stockpiles and industrial policy. For traders and investors, this creates significant policy risk, requiring an approach that weighs geopolitical alignment alongside conventional commodity dynamics.
- **If the supercycle is real, it won't be equal.** Clean energy, AI infrastructure and defence modernisation is driving real demand for critical minerals, but not all critical minerals will feel it equally. While demand for some minerals will far outstrip supply, the boom will not be a simple repeat of the 2000s China-led boom that lifted many commodities at once. A broad commodity supercycle requires sustained demand and supply responses to market price signals, conditions that are increasingly complicated by government intervention in critical minerals markets. The question is not whether critical minerals are in a supercycle, but which minerals can sustain one.
- **China is dominant and has a head start.** China's scale gives it considerable influence over supply and pricing, and Beijing has increasingly used export controls and other policy measures to advance its strategic objectives. This complicates the development of competing supply chains.
- **Fair markets are in, free markets are out.** Western governments, including Australia, the United States, Japan, Korea and the European Union, have taken more directly interventionist steps to establish parallel, ex-China supply chains. These efforts focus not on lowest-cost suppliers, but on using subsidies, strategic reserves, offtake guarantees and investment partnerships to support projects that may not otherwise be viable. Recent trade interventions and retaliatory measures have strengthened corporate interest in securing alternative sources of supply. But with limited ability to compete on cost and efficiency, many markets will rely on government support.
- **Australia is well positioned, but must avoid the quarry trap.** With significant mineral endowment, mining expertise, and political and financial market stability, Australia can benefit from the rising demand for critical minerals. It is placing greater emphasis on processing and other value-adding capabilities, a core goal of the Future Made in Australia plan. Australia's ability to deliver on this ambition while managing its competing strategic and commercial relationships with the United States and China will determine whether Australia can build both profitable markets and strategic resilience.

“China was a buyer, full stop.
That's not the game today.
China is pricing.”

Alicia García Herrero, Chief Economist, Asia-Pacific,
Natixis

Foreword



Jimmy Pan
*Head of Retail Business Development, ANZ
CMC Markets*

At CMC Markets, we have seen first-hand how quickly geopolitical developments can influence financial markets. Events that once appeared distant from trading decisions can now affect commodity prices, currencies, equities and supply chains almost immediately.

This is particularly evident in critical minerals. Lithium, copper, nickel and rare earth elements are no longer shaped solely by traditional supply-and-demand dynamics. Export controls, strategic stockpiles, industrial policy and competing geopolitical interests increasingly influence prices, investment decisions and supply availability.

For Australia, this creates both a significant opportunity and a complex investment environment. The country has the mineral resources, mining expertise and institutional strength to play a central role in developing more secure global supply chains. However, success will depend on more than extracting resources. Processing capacity, reliable energy, credible offtake agreements, supportive policy and access to capital will all determine where value is ultimately created.

For traders, the implications are substantial. Critical minerals should not be viewed as a single theme or a uniform diversification trade. Each commodity has its own demand drivers, market structure, geopolitical exposure and policy risks. Understanding these differences is essential when assessing both opportunity and volatility.

Experienced retail investors are also adapting their approach to this changing environment. Some are opening CFD accounts to hedge equity portfolios against geopolitical shocks. This can allow them to manage short-term volatility while retaining their core stock positions, rather than selling those investments in response to sudden market movements.

A more fragmented global economy means traders must look beyond headline demand forecasts. The key question is not simply which minerals are expected to be important, but which companies and projects can convert strategic importance into sustainable commercial value.

That requires careful analysis of supply chains, government policy, customer concentration, processing capability and market liquidity. It also requires an appreciation of the risks that arise when markets are increasingly shaped by political and strategic considerations.

CMC Markets is pleased to support this AFR Insights report, which explores the forces reshaping Australia's critical minerals sector and the trading opportunities that may emerge. We hope it provides a useful framework for understanding a market in transition and for navigating the opportunities and risks that come with it.



“This is the new normal. We’re not going to go back to the old world any time soon.”

Alex Toone, Managing Director,
Commodities, Trade, Transition, Westpac

Introduction: from globalisation to fragmentation


Geopolitics and geoeconomic fragmentation were once background risks for commodity markets. Now, they are directly shaping prices and the rules of trade.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz in late February 2026 demonstrated this in real time, as the closure drove an immediate spike in the price of oil. The price rise was dramatic, but it was ultimately “rational”, says Alicia García Herrero, chief economist for Asia-Pacific at Natixis, as traders priced in the very real risk of severe and ongoing supply shortages.

Yet the same crisis produced a far less predictable reaction in other commodity markets. Gold was already at an historic high, but it too surged on safe-haven demand, before reversing course as investors took profits and liquidated positions to meet margin calls and raise cash.¹ Many critical minerals also soared, some by as much as 125%.²

For critical minerals markets, however, these short-term fluctuations mask a far more profound structural shift. Critical minerals prices are no longer driven simply by traditional market signals but also by government interventions such as export controls, strategic stockpiles, and industrial policy. In contrast to the ‘rational’ price movements of other bulk commodities such as oil, critical minerals offer a useful case study in how the fracturing of the global economy is changing the way commodity markets function.

Chart 1: Price performance of gold, copper and platinum in 2026



Source: CMC Markets data

Australia sits at the centre of this shift. It has the mineral endowment to benefit from rising demand for critical minerals, and it is strategically aligned with the United States while simultaneously being deeply economically connected to China. For traders, critical minerals will be an instructive test of where value will accrue as markets become more politicised, fragmented and interventionist.

“This is the new normal,” says Alex Toone, managing director of commodities, trade, transition at Westpac. “The old world was one where Europe relied on cheap Russian gas. That’s gone. The rest of the world relied on buying cheap manufactured goods out of China. That world’s gone. We’re not going to go back to that world anytime soon.”


The new normal

The 2008 global financial crisis weakened the political consensus around hyperglobalisation. US-China rivalry, Russia’s separation from Western markets, conflict in the Middle East and growing trade friction among allies have produced a more fragmented and less predictable system.

In this new world, alliances and free market policies are being diluted or abandoned altogether in favour of interventionist industrial policy. The search for low-cost markets has been supplanted by a quest for supply chain durability and sovereign capability. This shift from economic efficiency to resilience comes at a cost. One World Economic Forum estimates at more than US\$200 billion annually around the world. It also adds to inflationary pressures.^{3 4}

Chart 2: Selected critical mineral prices and Brent crude

Monthly averages, January 2025 to August 2026. January 2026 = 100



Source: IMF⁵

Why critical minerals are critical

The impact of this shift is particularly evident in critical minerals markets, which are, by definition, political. Countries designate minerals as critical (or other similar classifications such as strategic) based on their economic importance and the riskiness of the minerals' supply chain.

Lists of critical minerals and strategic materials differ across jurisdictions, reflecting each country's priorities and risk exposure.⁶ Minerals such as lithium, nickel and rare earth elements are commonly classified as critical. Copper, classified as a strategic material in Australia, is also important for the technologies that underpin clean energy, AI infrastructure and defence applications. Projected demand from these cross-cutting themes has led boosters to argue that a critical minerals supercycle is emerging, with demand forecast to outstrip supply and keep prices well above the long-term trend.

Complicating this narrative, however, is the fact that critical minerals are not a single market and don't behave like one. Industrial and transition metals such as copper, aluminium and tin trade through relatively deep markets where typical commodity dynamics matter.⁷ Battery minerals such as lithium, nickel and cobalt are bolstered by demand from electrification but also exposed to policy interventions and rapid changes in technology.⁸ Rare earths and other small-volume strategic minerals are essential for battery and defence applications but are required only in very small volumes and typically require government support.⁹

Complex and fast-changing geopolitical and market dynamics have driven governments around the world, including Australia's, to step into critical minerals markets in ways that previously would have been unthinkable. "The market interventions by governments around the world have been extraordinary," says Warren Pearce, chief executive officer of the Association of Mining and Exploration Companies. The result, he argues, is a market that is no longer free in the conventional sense. "We're talking about thousands of market interventions by governments, essentially finding ways to subsidise or incentivise investment into their country. That's absolutely distorted any real market," he believes.

"Trying to create new commercial markets for some of these critical minerals is a fool's errand. There is no commercial benefit."

Hayley Channer, Director, Economic Security, United States Studies Centre




Chart 3: Australia's critical minerals and strategic materials

Australian geological potential: ● High ● Moderate ● Unknown

Critical Minerals



Strategic Materials



Source: DISR¹⁰

China as price setter

China is one country that has systematically intervened to support critical minerals production and supply chains, and its global dominance is now arguably the most significant factor shaping markets.


The country has spent almost three decades building capacity across the entire supply chain, spanning mining, processing technology and workforce expertise. In 2024, China accounted for 91 per cent of global refined output of magnet rare earths, for example.¹¹ It also controls the bulk of the world's refining and processing capacity for many of the most important minerals for AI, defence and battery applications. The IEA identifies China as the dominant refiner for 19 of the 20 strategic minerals it analysed, with an average market share of around 70 per cent.¹²

This market dominance has become an important lever of geoeconomic power. In the aluminium market, China maintains a strict 45 million-tonne ceiling on domestic primary output. This supports global prices, but also

protects domestic producers.¹³ As trade tensions have escalated between China and the United States, China imposed export controls on gallium and germanium in 2023 and on selected rare earth elements and related products in 2025. These are minerals that are all used in technologies such as semiconductors and permanent magnets, crucial for applications such as defence and AI.¹⁴

The extent of China's intervention makes the current critical minerals cycle fundamentally different from the commodity boom of the 2000s, Ms García Herrero believes. Then, China was primarily a buyer, adding demand to global markets. Today it is a price setter, which, she argues, makes critical minerals less rationally priced than other commodity markets such as oil. "There's no price discovery," she says. "China is pricing."

This means that prices won't necessarily rise in response to demand signals, as China has little incentive to allow sustained high prices that encourage competing supply. "China does not want high prices driving more production and competition," Ms García Herrero says. "If Japan asked Australia to produce more, China would simply dump [to lower] the price, and nobody wants to pay the difference." Rapid supply expansion by Chinese companies contributed to sharp falls in nickel and cobalt prices between 2022 and 2025, weakening competing producers and delaying investment in alternative supply.¹⁵







**“There’s no price discovery. China
is pricing.”**

Alicia García Herrero, Chief Economist,
Asia-Pacific, Natixis

Chart 4: China dominates refining and processing of many critical minerals



Source: IEA¹⁶

Commodity divergence: not all minerals are equal

Commodity markets have never moved in lockstep, but common macroeconomic forces often pulled them in the same direction. Now, with prices dependent on each commodity's exposure to geopolitics, industrial policy and supply chain risk, that relationship is weakening. The result is a fragmented market in which different forces are repricing different minerals. "The last supercycle was driven by Chinese demand over a 10- to 20-year period that lifted all commodities," Mr Toone says. "This time the drivers are quite different and more fragmented."


Iron ore prices, for example, are forecast to fall to a seven-year low in 2026, reflecting weak Chinese demand, subdued construction activity, and persistent oversupply.¹⁷ The picture for critical and industrial minerals is different: The World Bank forecasts its Metals and Minerals Price Index to rise by 17 per cent in 2026 year-on-year, pushing it to an all-time high.¹⁸ At the level of individual minerals, however, the index tells only part of the story, as each is driven by quite different dynamics.

"The last supercycle was driven by Chinese demand that lifted all commodities. This time the drivers are quite different and more fragmented."

Alex Toone, Managing Director, Commodities, Trade, Transition, Westpac

Chart 5: Metal prices pull in different directions

Forecast change in annual average prices, 2026 versus 2025 (%)



Source: World Bank¹⁹

Illustrating this, prices for lithium and rare earth elements spiked sharply in the first quarter of 2026, rising by 59 per cent and 38 per cent respectively, quarter-on-quarter.²⁰ Yet, even here, the catalysts were quite different.

Production cuts and the suspension of exports in Zimbabwe drove the rise in the lithium price. In contrast, rare earths, which are strategically important but have typically not been commercially viable to produce without government support, jumped in response to intensifying geopolitical tensions and allied efforts to diversify supply chains.²¹

Cobalt tells a different story again. Prices fell to a multi-year low in 2025 due to oversupply and changing battery technology.²² Its modest 3 per cent rise in the same quarter was more likely due to export restrictions imposed by the Democratic Republic of Congo to support prices than a revival in underlying demand.²³

Complexity clouds the supercycle debate

These differences make the prospect of a new supercycle hotly debated. A true supercycle is more than a standard price rally; it involves a prolonged upswing driven by structural demand growth that supply takes years to meet.²⁴ The last true supercycle, which saw iron ore become Australia's largest export and triggered a capital investment boom, was driven by persistently strong demand from China's steelmaking sector over several decades.

On paper, the conditions for a new critical minerals supercycle look promising. Daniel Sullivan, the head of global natural resources at Janus Henderson, an asset manager, writes of years of underinvestment in commodity production.²⁵ Coupled with projected increases in demand due to the energy transition, artificial intelligence and defence modernisation, he believes, this points to the likelihood of a sustained capital investment boom. This view is not an outlier: In its 2021 assessment, the International Energy Agency projected that clean energy technology will drive a doubling of demand for minerals between 2020 and 2040, based on announced policies.²⁶



Yet the idea of a supercycle for every commodity is “a little bit of wishful thinking,” Ms García Herrero believes. “Demand itself is not a supercycle,” she says. “You also need a lot of demand that supply cannot feed, which then shows up in prices.” In a market driven largely by government policy choices rather than traditional supply and demand dynamics, that outcome is far from certain, agrees Mr Toone. Any supercycle is likely to be uneven and commodity-specific, he says.

Ambitious decarbonisation policies imply strong long-term demand for critical minerals, but growing policy uncertainty could slow the rollout of clean energy technologies and weaken those forecasts. Long mine development timelines mean supply is slow to respond to demand signals, compounding the uncertainty.²⁷ In a competitive global race to bring critical minerals to market, Australia’s ability to respond is constrained by slow project approvals and complex permitting processes, Mr Pearce says.

Demand from electric vehicles helped drive prices sharply higher in 2021 and 2022, bringing about a rapid expansion in supply.

Lithium provides a cautionary example. Demand from electric vehicles helped drive prices sharply higher in 2021 and 2022, bringing about a rapid expansion in supply. But supply then grew faster than demand, pushing the market into surplus and sending prices down by more than 80 per cent from their peak.²⁸ “We turned on a lot of production upstream,” Mr Pearce says, “then suddenly we flooded the market. Prices went initially through the roof, and then through the floor.” These wild fluctuations have delayed new investment and forced some producers to curtail output.²⁹

The insight is that commodities can no longer be treated as a single diversification trade, Mr Toone cautions. This represents both a risk and an opportunity for traders, who must consider not only supply and demand, but also the direction, durability and beneficiaries of government intervention, which can undermine value in one market while creating scarcity or price support in another.

From free market to fair market



Photo: Trevor Collens

“A couple of years ago, the discussion was focused on a free market. Now people are talking about a fair market.”

Rowena Smith, Chief Executive Officer, Australian Strategic Materials

China’s intervention in the market is no longer unique and its pricing power sits within a growing “spaghetti bowl” of overlapping trade agreements, competing industrial policies and increasingly incompatible market blocs.³⁰ Between January 2020 and May 2026, national governments introduced nearly 100 new export-restrictive measures on critical minerals, including bans, taxes and licensing requirements.³¹ Only 16 of these were introduced by China.

Jurisdictions such as Australia, the United States, the European Union, Japan and Korea are now proactively intervening in the critical minerals market to coordinate capital, customers, and policy. Yet these efforts to build a competitive critical minerals market are well behind China. Rebuilding the industrial capacity, customer relationships and pricing mechanisms that will make non-China supply chains commercially viable will be a years-or decades-long process.³² “It’s not commercially viable to dig up and process minerals from Australian soil, otherwise, major mining companies would already be doing it. Energy and labour costs in Australia are too high. Plus, we’ve lost the expertise for processing over time from it being outsourced to China,” says Ms Channer.

Western industrial policy, such as Australia’s Critical Minerals Strategy 2023-2030 and its Future Made in Australia policy, the United States’ Project VAULT³³ and the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act³⁴ are all designed to unlock this processing bottleneck by supporting projects that conventional market settings would not sustain.

As Rowena Smith, chief executive officer of Australian Strategic Materials, a rare earths and critical minerals company, notes, the language of these governments has shifted from “free market” to “fair market”: a recognition that policy support and price stability are the only way to compete with China’s state-led industrial model, which has long subsidised a lower-cost, integrated supply chain.

The cost of resilience

While new parallel supply chains will build strategic resilience for Western countries, they will also cost more, particularly during the transition. For Hayley Channer, director of economic security at the United States Studies Centre, that means these market shifts cannot be interpreted through conventional commercial logic alone. “None of this makes economic sense. It only makes sense from a national security perspective.”

A communication breakdown between government and industry exacerbates the unpredictability, Ms Channer believes. While building resilience requires coordination, both sides are reluctant to share the intelligence needed to achieve it. “Governments are really uncomfortable speaking directly to industry about what the geopolitical threats are because business people lack security

clearances and government is worried about rent seeking behaviour,” she notes, while the private sector “is reluctant to share information with government because business is often at the forefront of coercion or intellectual property theft and doesn’t want to risk exposing those vulnerabilities to either the government or public,” Ms Channer says. Without a trusted framework for exchange, coordinating a secure, ex-China supply chain remains structurally difficult, she believes. For investors, this creates uncertainty about where gaps may exist between the proposed parallel supply chain and commercial reality.



A new demand signal

Domestically-focused policy is maturing into cross-jurisdictional collaboration that aims to have several countries contribute at different points along the supply chain, Ms Smith says. Integrated businesses such as Australian Strategic Materials, which operates across Australia, the United States and Korea, are striving to link processing, customers and government support across multiple jurisdictions, Ms Smith notes.

This new effort at market making is also reflected in the diplomatic arena. Of the 73 international critical energy transition mineral partnership agreements signed in the past two decades, more than three-quarters have been concluded since 2022.³⁵ In June 2026, G7 leaders (with Australia's support) backed measures to reduce dependence for rare earths and permanent magnets on any single supplier outside the G7 and its partner countries to under 60 per cent by 2030.³⁶ G7 countries and their partners announced 195 projects representing €64 billion in investment in the first half of 2026 alone.³⁷

In a rebuff to the free-market economic approach long considered orthodox by Western Treasuries, G7 countries also proposed measures to strengthen demand certainty, including demand aggregation and joint procurement. Market participants have welcomed this move. The G7's stronger language on demand signals could be a "game changer," says Ms Smith. "This [challenge] can't be just fixed from the supply side. There has to be a demand signal that is strong enough to support a commercially viable alternative."

The government-led push is also triggering a marked shift among corporate buyers. "Three years ago people were nervous to be the one who went first," says Ms Smith. "That dynamic shifted when the Trump tariff and the retaliatory restrictions came in. Then suddenly people are thinking, if I don't go first, I'm going to be the one without product."

"The level of collaboration across governments and alignment on policy is miles higher than it has been previously."

Rowena Smith, Chief Executive Officer, Australian Strategic Materials



“This [challenge] can’t be just fixed from the supply side. There has to be a demand signal that is strong enough to support a commercially viable alternative.”

Rowena Smith, Chief Executive Officer,
Australian Strategic Materials

Australia's position: opportunity, risk and the quarry trap

For Australia, the tension created by fragmented critical minerals markets is acute. “Our biggest customer is also our biggest competitor, and that makes it really challenging,” Mr Pearce says. Producers seeking capital or offtake agreements from Western countries can face rules that limit involvement in Chinese supply chains. “In reality, we’re forced to choose rather than being able to take advantage of both,” he says.

Yet, in spite of the challenges, Australia is one of the best-placed jurisdictions to manage this balance. Australia is in “pole position,” says Mr Toone, with one of the world’s most significant mineral endowments, underpinned by decades of modern mining expertise, 28 critical mineral agreements with partners, political stability and capital markets infrastructure that traders value.


Currently, much of the profit accruing to Australia comes from mining critical minerals rather than processing them. For example, Australia exports large volumes of spodumene concentrate, a raw material used to produce battery lithium, to China. This means that most is refined and processed offshore, allowing China to capture much of the economic value.³⁸ For many in Australia, this is a missed opportunity. The goal, Mr Pearce says, should not be to open more mines, but to build capabilities that capture more downstream value onshore.

Public policy is moving in this direction. The Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve,³⁹ Future Made in Australia and joint Australia-US commitments to support rare earth refining and other processing facilities⁴⁰ all point to a greater willingness to use policy to de-risk downstream investment. From an investment perspective, these commitments can aid in bridging the gap between strategic need and commercial bankability.

But policy cannot solve every market constraint, and even government officials are reluctant to leverage their own funding mechanisms, Ms Channer says. “There’s little incentive for officials to use some of the existing financing tools available for the government to invest in companies because if the investment goes badly, they will be blamed or their minister could be dragged in front of Senate estimates to justify the bad investment decision. Plus, government investment is really needed when banks, super or venture capital won’t invest, and too often, the government is only willing to invest when those other funders are also ready.”

Australia also lacks domestic demand and end users for some critical minerals, Ms Smith says. “That piece of the supply chain can only thrive if the rest of the ecosystem is present.” This makes the opportunity more about global integration and capital deployment than building a wholly domestic market, she believes. Australian companies also play a substantial role in critical minerals exploration and production overseas, something that has been historically underappreciated in both policy and trading circles, she says.⁴¹

This highlights a choice for Australia: commit to the required policy and investment in downstream capabilities, whether in Australia or through global integration, or accept the role of quarry to a more fragmented world.



“None of this makes economic sense. It only makes sense from a national security perspective.”

Hayley Channer, Director, Economic Security,
United States Studies Centre

Conclusion: pricing a new market

Critical minerals sit at the intersection of three powerful investment themes: the energy transition, artificial intelligence infrastructure and defence modernisation. The demand story is real, but traders can't assume it will rerun the China-led commodity boom of the 2000s, when rising demand lifted a broad basket of commodities and rewarded scale, volume and low-cost production.

“The goal should not just be to get mines up, but to realise greater value from those opportunities.”

Warren Pearce, Chief Executive Officer,
Association of Mining and Exploration Companies

Instead, this cycle will be more fragmented. Commodity markets are being shaped by export controls, strategic stockpiles, industrial policy, customer concentration and the emergence of competing China-centred and Western-aligned supply chains. Geology still matters, but traders must now factor in whether a project has processing capability and a clear route to an end market. It is a test of whether security can replace comparative advantage as the basis for investment.

For Australia, the opportunity is filled with trade-offs. Its mineral endowment, mining expertise and alliance network give it a strong starting position. Yet in this geopolitical environment, returns will not flow simply because the minerals can be dug up and sent offshore. “Australia has the commodities that the world needs,” Mr Toone says. “The opportunity now is to turn that resource advantage into industrial capability, domestic resilience, energy security and long-term economic resilience.”

Traders must account for policy objectives as well as conventional market fundamentals. Some parts of the market may deliver supercycle-like returns. Others will remain too small, distorted or vulnerable to support long-term upside. In a fragmented world, value will accrue less to those who hold resources than to those who can turn them into secure, bankable and strategically useful supply.



End notes

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